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MICEIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

REVOCATION OF Wri:,Ls-DFPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION-Testator, after providing in his will for the payment of debts and expenses of administration, devised and bequeathed the residue of his estate "to my wife,
Alice B. Houghton, if she is living at the time of my death; and if she is not
living at the time of my death, then .. 1• to my brother-in-law, Stephen M.
Stuart, of Fort Myers, Florida," The will was duly-executed in this form, but
thereafter the words "my brother-in-law, Stephen M. Stuart, of Fort Myers,
Florida," were lined out and the testator inserted the following: "Give to
Louisa Paquin the shop and property known as 2015 South Fort St. with the
business as it is, and the property at 2747 to my attorney Walter M. Nelson
Lot Io of Whiffle & Scov~l Sub, and nothing to Steven M. Stuart." The will
was not re-executed. The testator's wife predeceased him. Held, the will
was revoked except as to the provision for the payment of debts and expenses of
administration, and for• the appointment of an executor, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation being inapplicable. In re Houghton?s Estate, 310
Mich. 613, 621, 17 N.W. (2d) 774, 18 N.W. (2d) 254 (1945).
The court distinguished the case of In re Bonkowski's Estate,1 in which
it appeared that, after the execution of the will, the name of one legatee was,
at the testator's direction, stricken out, and another name substituted. The doctrine
of dependent relative revocation was applied and the name of the original legatee
was permitted to stand. The court there recognized that in case of a substitution
made by a testator in the belief that it is valid, there may be a presumption
that the testator would have preferred the o_riginal language of the will to stand
had he known the substituted provision was invalid. In the instant case, however, the court apparently regards the existence of substitutional provisions as
significant only in determining th~ testator's intent to revoke, and states, quoti~g '
the Bonkowski case, that "the rule is generally applicable that if a testator purposely and intentionally destroys his will, the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation does not apply, even though testator may have intended when he
destroyed his will to execute at some future time a new will disposing of all his
property." It is believed that, in accordance with the better cases 2 and the
opinions of writers on this subject,3 the doctrine of dependent relative revoca266 Mich. u2, 253 N.W. 235 (1934).
See, for example, Ruel v. Hardy, 90 N.H. 240, 6 A. (2d) 753 (1939). For
American cases on this subject see the notes in 62 A.L.R. 1401 (1929), and 115
A.L.R. 721 (1938).
.
3 Warren, "Dependent Relative Revocation," 33 HARV. L. REv. 337 (1920);
Evans, "Testimentary Revocation by Act to the Document and Dependent Relative
Revocation," 23 KY. L.J. 559 (1935); ATKINSON, W1LLs, §§ 161, 162 (1937);
I PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed., §§ 478-486 (1941).
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tion should be applied in such a case as the one before the court only if it appears
that the testator would have preferred his original language to stand had he been
aware that the substituted provisions could not take effect. Here the unconditional statement of the testator that the original devisee was not to take and
the fact that, even if the substituted provisions had been validr they would not
have disposed of all the property covered by the revoked provision, lead strongly
to the conclusion that the decision of the court is right. It is believed, however,
that it might have been better to rationalize the conclusion on the basis of applying a doctrine designed to give relief for mistake rather than as a matter of
animus rroocandi."'
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"'ATKINSON, WILLS

389 (1937).

